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A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS: LEGAL AND 
HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF PROTECTING INDIGENOUS 
CULTURAL RIGHTS INVOLVING LAND DISPUTES IN 
JAPAN, NEW ZEALAND,  AND HAWAI‘I 
Zachary Browning* 
Abstract: This article explores how courts in developed market economies address 
the tension between recognizing the rights of indigenous groups and addressing questions 
of land development that supposedly benefit the majority populations. Using a comparative 
approach, the article identifies three jurisdictions in the Pacific Rim with indigenous 
populations: (1) the State of Hawai‘i in the United States, (2) Japan, and (3) New Zealand 
and analyzes how land use courts and administrative bodies have addressed the thorny 
question pursuing development while fulfilling their obligations to indigenous populations. 
While the State of Hawai‘i has explicit state constitutional protections, Japan and New 
Zealand each demonstrate that international treaties like the ICCPR may provide another 
important source of legal protection. However, the article concludes that explicit 
constitutional protections of indigenous groups provide the greatest level of support when 
combined with other constitutional protections like administrative due process. 
Cite as: Zachary Browning, A Comparative Analysis: Legal and Historical Analysis of 
Protecting Indigenous Cultural Rights Involving Land Disputes in Japan, New Zealand, 
and Hawai‛i, 28 WASH. INT’L L.J. 207 (2019). 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 A major issue emerging in the twenty-first century is how to recognize 
and protect the rights of indigenous peoples and their unique cultures, 
histories, and values. The dilemma is especially daunting for developed 
democracies with indigenous minorities whose land was conquered, 
confiscated, or claimed many years ago. To many indigenous peoples, land 
access is critical to the protection of their identity, culture, and history. 
Denying recognition or protection conflicts with the democratic ideas of 
justice and equality that democracies purport to represent. However, in 
addition to indigenous rights, courts must consider modern property regimes, 
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the rights of owners, and the contemporary development needs of society. 
Therefore, land use questions involving the protection of indigenous rights are 
particularly thorny for courts. 
 The examples of Japan, New Zealand, and the State of Hawaiʻi 
(Hawaiʻi) provide three different models for how courts may analyze and 
answer questions of land rights when indigenous minorities bring suits 
challenging proposed land developments. Japan, which has historically 
defined itself as an ethnically and culturally homogenous nation, has struggled 
to recognize the rights of its indigenous peoples and define the scope of 
indigenous rights protections.1 Nevertheless, Japan has made strides in at least 
recognizing the rights of the Ainu, an indigenous minority with origins in the 
northern island of Hokkaido.2 In contrast, New Zealand and Hawaiian courts 
have both succeeded and failed at recognizing the land rights of the Māori and 
Native Hawaiians.3 This recognition has coincided with the adoption of a 
Western property regime and changes in sovereignty. 4  In Hawai‘i, the 
adoption of a written Constitution has provided additional protection. The 
scarcity of land and high demand for property development has pushed those 
courts to resolve the tension between indigenous rights and the need for 
development.5 Accordingly, New Zealand and Hawaiʻi provide an interesting 
comparison with the Japanese courts.  
 This Comment will first explain the legal systems of Japan, New 
Zealand, and Hawai‘i and the fundamental differences between them. Second, 
it will examine the relationship between the Ainu people and the wajin 
majority6 throughout history, and the legal relationship between the Ainu and 
                                                 
 
1  CULTURAL SURVIVAL, OBSERVATIONS ON THE STATE OF INDIGENOUS HUMAN RIGHTS IN JAPAN 1–
2 (2017), https://www.culturalsurvival.org/sites/default/files/JapanUPRR2017_0.pdf. 
2  May-Ying Lam, ‘Land of the Human Begins’: The World of the Ainu, Little-Known Indigenous 
People of Japan, WASH. POST, (July 27, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/in-
sight/wp/2017/07/28/land-of-the-human-beings-the-world-of-the-ainu-little-known-indigenous-people-of-
japan/. 
3  See Kalipi v. Hawaiian Trust Co., Ltd, 656 P.2d 745, 752 (Haw. 1982) (holding that Native 
Hawaiians may enter undeveloped, privately-owned lands to practice Native Hawaiian customs and traditions 
when no harm occurs to the property owner).  
4  Lee S. Motteler & J. Patricia Morgan Swenson, Hawaii, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (May 24, 
2018), https://www.britannica.com/place/Hawaii-state/Government-and-society.  
5  See generally Samuel J. Panarella, Not in My Backyard: The Clash between Native Hawaiian 
Gathering Rights and Western Concepts of Property in Hawaii, 28 ENVTL. L. 467 (1998).  
6  “Wajin” is a term used in Japan mainstream ethno-racial majority. It originated to distinguish the 
settlers of mainland Japan from other ethnic groups, including the Ainu in Hokkaido, the Ryukyu people in 
Okinawa, and Taiwanese and Korean ethnic minorities as the Japanese Empire expanded. See Mark Levin, 
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the Japanese State. This section will examine the Japanese court’s decision in 
the landmark Nibutani Dam case. Third, this Comment will discuss the 
relationship between the Māori and the New Zealand Crown with a focus on 
the creation of specialized courts for Māori land disputes. Fourth, it will 
explore the Hawaiʻi Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence to cases raised by 
Native Hawaiian plaintiffs to halt development projects. Here, the role of 
Hawaiian sovereignty remains a thorny and complicated issue as the Kingdom 
of Hawaiʻi, which predated the U.S. annexation, was autonomous and 
conducted its own foreign policy with other foreign nations. While Hawaiʻi’s 
State Constitution aims to protect Native Hawaiian rights and Hawaiʻi’s 
Congressional delegation has pushed for federal recognition of Native 
Hawaiians providing the same government-to-government status as tribes on 
the continental United States,7  this has not eliminated demands for even 
greater autonomy or outright independence in Hawaiʻi. As a result, this 
Comment will compare the ideas and legal framework used by each system. 
Finally, this Comment will conclude with lessons for each corresponding 
jurisdiction.    
II. BACKGROUND: THREE DIFFERENT LEGAL SYSTEMS  
Most nations belong to one of the following two dominant legal 
systems—a civil law system or a common law system. Japan adopted the 
former approach and America and New Zealand retained the latter one.8 Japan 
has continually sought to modernize its legal system.9 In Japan, the modern 
civil law system emerged from the reformist Meiji government.10 After years 
of isolation, Japan looked outward from 1868 to become a modern, 
                                                 
 
Hihanteki jinshu riron to Nihon-hō wajin no jinshu-teki tokken ni tsuite (批判的人種理論と日本法―和人
の人種的特権について) [The Wajin’s Whiteness: Law and Race Privilege in Japan], 80 HŌRITSU JIHŌ 80 
(2008). 
7  In 2010, the U.S. House of Representatives passed the Native Hawaiian Government Reorganization 
Act, which provided federal recognition of Native Hawaiians and allowed for the creation of a governing 
entity organized by Native Hawaiians. The bill failed to pass the Senate. See ROBERT T. ANDERSON ET AL., 
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW: CASES AND COMMENTARY (3d ed. 2015).  
8  Piyali Sam, Major Differences Between the Japanese and American Legal Systems, @WASHULAW 
BLOG, (Nov. 20, 2013), https://onlinelaw.wustl.edu/blog/major-differences-between-the-japanese-and-
american-legal-systems. 
9  Michael Auslin, Japan’s Endless Search for Modernity, ATLANTIC, (Jan. 3, 2018), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/01/japan-abe-meiji-restoration-china/549536/. 
10  See R. Daniel Keleman & Eric C. Sibbit, The Americanization of Japanese Law, 23 U. PA. J. INT'L 
L. 269, 292 (2002). 
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international power. 11  Legal reform was considered essential to Japan’s 
development, and the Japanese sought to model their legal system after France 
and Germany, which were then considered the two most advanced legal 
systems.12 As a result, Japan became a civil law country.13 The Civil Code 
took effect in 1898.14 It remains in place today, having survived two World 
Wars and the adoption of the 1946 Constitution.15 
 The primary difference between a civil law and common law system is 
that codified statutes predominate in the former.16 Although common law also 
makes use of statutes, judicial cases are considered an important source of law 
systems.17 This provides judges with an important role in lawmaking. For the 
sake of consistency, common law systems form rules based on precedent from 
higher courts, whereas in civil law systems, codes and statutes are expected to 
cover all eventualities and circumstances.18 Past judgments by courts are mere 
guides when interpreting statutes. As a result, judges in civil law systems play 
the role of investigators and trial procedure is much more bureaucratic and 
focused on fact-finding.19 The signature feature of the common law legal 
system is the trial—a duel between opponents, involving oral testimony from 
live witnesses and the submission of exhibits with a judge acting as a referee.20 
Trial is an adversarial process, which is a major difference from the Japanese 
system. 
 New Zealand is a common law nation whose Western legal traditions 
were adopted from the British legal system.21 One key difference between 
                                                 
 
11  The Meiji Restoration and Modernization, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY: ASIA FOR EDUCATORS (2009), 
http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/special/japan_1750_meiji.htm. 
12  Legal Research Guide: Japan, THE LAW LIBRARY OF CONGRESS (June 9, 2015), 
https://www.loc.gov/law/help/legal-research-guide/japan.php.   
13  Id.   
14  Percy R. Luney, Jr., Traditions and Foreign Influences: Systems of Law in China and Japan, 52 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 129, 148–49 (1989).  
15  Harald Baum, Comparison of Law, Transfer of Legal Concepts, and Creation of a Legal Design: 
The Case of Japan, in LEGAL INNOVATIONS IN ASIA: JUDICIAL LAWMAKING AND THE INFLUENCE OF 
COMPARATIVE LAW 61, 68–73 (John O. Haley & Toshio Takenaka eds., 2014). 
16 The Common Law and Civil Law Traditions, THE ROBBINS COLLECTION: U.C. BERKELEY SCHOOL 
OF LAW (2010), https://www.law.berkeley.edu/library/robbins/CommonLawCivilLawTraditions.html.  
17  Id. 
18  Id.  
19  S.B., What is the difference between common and civil law?, ECONOMIST (July 17, 2013), 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2013/07/economist-explains-10. 
20  Monroe H. Freedman, Our Constitutionalized Adversary System, 1 CHAP. L. REV. 57, 57 (1998). 
21 Margaret Greville, Access to New Zealand Law, GLOBALEX (Nov./Dec. 2014), 
http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/New_Zealand1.html.  
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New Zealand and both Japan and the United States (or the State of Hawaiʻi) 
is that New Zealand does not have a written constitution.22 The absence of a 
written constitution has led to criticism in the international community that 
the nation could more adequately protect Māori rights with written 
constitutional guarantees. 23  Instead, New Zealand’s constitutional 
arrangements are a patchwork of various documents which that include the 
Constitution Act 1986, the New Zealand Bill Of Rights Act 1990, the 
Electoral Act 1993, and the Treaty of Waitangi, as well as broader traditions 
and norms.24  
 The common law system in Hawaiʻi predates its annexation by the 
United States. Hawaiʻi adopted a common law system in the 1840s after the 
arrival of American missionaries.25  
III. THE AINU IN JAPAN 
A. Historical Background  
 The Ainu people developed their distinct culture and settlements in 
Hokkaido, the northern part of Honshu, the southern part of Sakhalin, and the 
Kuril Islands.26 The Ainu were subjects of the Yuan Dynasty of China from 
1308 to the sixteenth century.27 The first documented encounter between the 
Ainu and wajin occurred in 1356.28 Suwa Daimyojin Ekotoba describes the 
Ainu as the image of Oni (devil), a term used to discriminate against foreign 
people.29 During this period, wajin began settling in the southern parts of 
                                                 
 
22  NEW ZEALAND MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, THE NEW ZEALAND LEGAL SYSTEM: A GUIDE TO THE 
CONSTITUTION, GOVERNMENT, AND LEGISLATURE OF NEW ZEALAND 4–5, 
http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/APCITY/UNPAN013991.pdf (last visited Nov. 18, 
2018). [hereinafter NEW ZEALAND LEGAL SYSTEM]. 
23  UPR Recommendations New Zealand received, UPR INFO: DATABASE OF RECOMMENDATIONS, 
https://www.upr-info.org/database/index.php (select “New Zealand” under the “State under Review” filter) 
(last visited Nov. 18, 2018). 
24  NEW ZEALAND LEGAL SYSTEM supra note 22, at 4–5.  
25  Jane L. Silverman, Imposition of a Western Judicial System in the Hawaiian Monarchy, 16 
HAWAIIAN J. HIST. 48, 57 (1982).  
26  Mitsuharu Vincent Okada, The Plight of Ainu, Indigenous People of Japan, 1 J. INDIGENOUS SOC. 
DEV. 1, 2 (2012). 
27  BRETT L. WALKER, THE CONQUEST OF AINU LANDS: ECOLOGY AND CULTURE IN JAPANESE 
EXPANSION, 1590-1800 132–33 (University of California Press 2006).  
28  Okada, supra note 26, at 3.  
29  Id.  
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Hokkaido.30 The Ainu and wajin traded with each other—yet many of these 
arrangements favored wajin.31 A general pattern of unequal trade, conflict, 
and colonialism occurred.32  
 By the 1860s, Japan claimed Hokkaido as its sovereign territory.33 The 
Meiji government established a plan to develop the island in 1869.34 The 
acceleration of wajin migration coincided with the forced assimilation of the 
Ainu. 35  Traditional Ainu ways of living, culture, and language were 
prohibited.36  From then on, the Ainu were forced to give up their traditional 
hunter-gatherer lifestyle and become farmers.37 The Census Registration Act 
of 1871 forced the Ainu to adopt Japanese last names.38 Meanwhile, under the 
Property Law, the Meiji government confiscated traditional Ainu land that 
wajin considered underdeveloped.39 While wajin individuals and businesses 
received incentives to move to Hokkaido, the Ainu were excluded from the 
policies that were intended to develop Hokkaido. 40  The results of these 
policies were devastating for the Ainu.  
 After a century of policies enforcing assimilation and discrimination, 
Ainu people struggle to maintain and preserve their traditional methods of 
living, culture, identity, beliefs, land, and education. It is not uncommon for 
Ainu to hide their identity to avoid discrimination.41 In 1993, there were less 
than ten remaining speakers of the Ainu language.42 This fact is especially 
                                                 
 
30  Norimitsu Onishi, Despite Free Land, No Cry of Northward Ho in Japan, N.Y. TIMES (June 3, 
2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/03/world/asia/03iht-03shibetsu.13410595.html. 
31  Richard M. Siddle, The Ainu: Indigenous People of Japan, in JAPAN’S MINORITIES: THE ILLUSION 
OF HOMOGENEITY 25–26 (Michael Weiner ed., 2008).  
32  Id.  
33  Id.  
34  Okada, supra note 26, at 3. 
35  Hiroshi Maruyama, Note, Japan's Post-War Ainu Policy. Why the Japanese Government Has Not 
Recognized Ainu Indigenous Rights?, 49 POLAR RECORD 204, 204–07 (2013). 
36  A Shameful Statement on the Ainu, JAPAN TIMES (Nov. 17, 2014), 
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2014/11/17/editorials/a-shameful-statement-on-
ainu/#.WsEov2aZPq0. 
37  John B. Cornell, Ainu Assimilation and Cultural Extinction: Acculturation Policy in Hokkaido, 3 
ETHNOLOGY 287, 287–88 (1964). 
38  Okada, supra note 26, at 5. 
39  Id.  
40  Alexander Bukh, Ainu Identity and Japan’s Identity: The Struggle for Subjectivity, 28 COPENHAGEN 
J. ASIAN STUD. 35, 36–38 (2010).  
41  Okada, supra note 26, at 11. 
42  David McGrogan, A Shift in Japan's Stance on Indigenous Rights and its Implications, 17 INT'L J. 
MINORITY & GROUP RTS. 355, 356 (2010), http://www.academia.edu/3299428/ 
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devastating for the preservation of Ainu culture because the Ainu did not 
develop a written language.43 Furthermore, Ainu are disproportionately poor 
and undereducated; in Hokkaido, roughly 56% of Ainu are employed in low-
wage industries,44 and only 17% of Ainu have college degrees, compared to 
the national average of 54%. 45  More Ainu receive government-supported 
welfare than the national average.46  
 In light of the different history, culture, and socioeconomic status of the 
Ainu, the Japanese government has historically pursued a policy of denying 
those differences even exist.47 At the time, the government’s official position 
was that there were no ethnic minorities in Japan.48 The Ainu were “former 
aborigines” totally subsumed into the Japanese homogenous state. In reports 
to the treaty monitoring bodies of the United Nations (U.N.), the Ainu were 
referred to with euphemisms such as “the group” and described as living “lives 
that differ little from those other constituents of the society.”49 Nevertheless, 
beginning in the 1980s, Ainu activists began organizing with greater energy.50 
The Ainu Association of Hokkaido (AAH) lobbied the Japanese government 
for greater educational, political, cultural, and fishing rights.51 The AAH’s 
main goal was recognition of the existence of the Ainu people both 
domestically and internationally.52 By 1987, an Ainu delegation was sent to 
the U.N. Working Group on Indigenous Populations.53  
 
                                                 
 
A_Shift_in_Japans_Stance_on_Indigenous_Rights_and_its_Implications_International_Journal_of_Minorit
y_and_Group_Rights_2010. 
43  Sherley Wetherhold, The Disappearing Languages of Asia, THE ATLANTIC (July 9, 2012), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/07/the-disappearing-languages-of-asia/259530/. 
44  Okada, supra note 26, at 9–10. 
45  Id.  
46  Id. 
47  Bukh, supra note 40, at 38.  
48  McGrogan, supra note 42, at 357. 
49  Id. 
50  Ann-Elise Lewallen, Ainu Women and Indigenous Modernity in Settler Colonial Japan, 15 ASIA 
PAC. J. 1, 3 (2017).  
51  Simon Cotterill, Ainu Success: The Political and Cultural Achievements of Japan’s Indigenous 
Minority, 9 ASIA-PAC. J. 1, 5 (2011), http://apjjf.org/-Simon-Cotterill/3500/article.pdf. 
52  What is the Ainu Association of Hokkaido?, AINU ASSOCIATION OF HOKKAIDO, https://www.ainu-
assn.or.jp/english/outline.html (translating in English) (last visited Apr. 3, 2018). 
53  Ainu Historical Events, AINU ASSOCIATION OF HOKKAIDO, https://www.ainu-
assn.or.jp/english/history.html (translating in English) (last visited Apr. 3, 2018). 
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B. The Nibutani Dam Decision 
 The Nibutani Dam Decision was a landmark case in Japanese law, 
representing the first time that a Japanese court recognized the right of an 
ethnic minority to enjoy his or her culture based on Article 13 54  of the 
Japanese Constitution and the International Covenant on Civil & Political 
Rights (ICCPR).55 The Sapporo District Court held that a public dam project 
was illegal because the government failed to adequately consider the project’s 
effect on Ainu culture. 56  In doing so, the court reached three important 
conclusions. First, the court held that the Ainu are a distinct minority culture 
in Japan deserving of protection.57 Second, Japan has a public policy interest 
in protecting Ainu cultural rights resulting from the legacy of discrimination 
and forced assimilation that weakened Ainu culture.58 Finally, the court found 
that the dam construction project itself threatened to damage Ainu cultural 
interests.59 
C. Facts and Background 
 The Nibutani Dam Decision resulted from the construction of the 
Nibutani and Shiratori dams in Hokkaido’s Saru River. The project’s first 
stage began with planning in 1973 by the Hokkaido Regional Development 
Bureau (the Bureau). The Bureau initially intended for the dam to supply 
water to a nearby industrial park. 60  However, the Bureau later added 
hydroelectricity, flood control, and other goals for the project.61 The project’s 
critics argued that it threatened the livelihood of the Ainu in three ways. First, 
the dam would alter salmon migration—a source of sustenance that Ainu 
                                                 
 
54  NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION] art. 13 (Japan) (“All of the people shall be respected 
as individuals. Their right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness shall, to the extent that it does not 
interfere with the public welfare, be the supreme consideration in legislation and in other governmental 
affairs.”).  
55  Sapporo Chihō Saibansho [Sapporo Dist. Ct.] Mar. 27, 1997, Hei 9 (gyō u) No. 9, 1598 HANREI 
JIHŌ [HANJI] 33, 938 HANREI TAIMUZU [HANTA] 75 (Japan), in THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM: CASES, 
CODES, & COMMENTARY 296 (Curtis J. Milhaupt, J. Mark Ramseyer, Mark D. West 2d eds., 2012) (Kayano 
v. Hokkaidō Expropriation Committee) [hereinafter Nibutani Dam Decision].  
56  Id.  
57  Id. at 302.  
58  Id. at 303.  
59  Id. at 304.  
60  Kenichi Matsui, Nibutani Dam on Ainu Homeland, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE ATLAS (June 19, 
2015), https://ejatlas.org/conflict/dam-on-ainu-homeland.  
61  Id.  
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fishermen relied on. 62  Second, the dam would destroy traditional burial 
grounds as well as historical and sacred sites. 63  Finally, the dam would 
inundate land that Ainu property owners retained for farming since the Former 
Aboriginal Protection Act of 1899.64  
 In 1987, the Hokkaido Expropriation Committee (Expropriation 
Committee) entered negotiations with landowners of the proposed dam site.65 
When some Ainu owners refused to sell their land—both unsatisfied with the 
price and demanding greater compensation for the Ainu that inhabited the 
area—the Expropriation Committee condemned the land using the Land 
Expropriation Law. 66  Two private plaintiffs appealed the administrative 
ruling to the Minister of Construction in 1989.67 Because the Minister of 
Construction failed to review the matter, the plaintiffs sued the Expropriation 
Committee in Sapporo District Court on October 26, 1993.68 The court did not 
publish its decision until March 27, 1997.69 Nevertheless, dam construction 
commenced despite the plaintiffs’ administrative appeals and lawsuit in 
Sapporo District Court.70  
D. The Sapporo District Court’s Ruling 
 The Sapporo District Court considered the dispute between the private 
landowners and the Expropriation Committee in light of Japan’s Land 
Expropriation Law. 71  Article 20(3) requires a balancing test between the 
planned project’s public benefits and the resulting harm to both public and 
private interests.72 The balancing test should be comprehensive according to 
the following factors: 
                                                 
 
62  Id. 
63  Id.  
64  Id.  
65  Id.  
66  Id.  
67  Nibutani Dam Decision, supra note 55, at 296.  
68  Andrew Kaisuke Stewart, Kayano v. Hokkaido Expropriation Committee Revisited: Recognition of 
Ryukyuans as a Cultural Minority Under the International Covenant on Civil and Political rights, an 
Alternative Paradigm for Okinawan Demilitarization, 4 ASIAN-PACIFIC L. & POL’Y J. 387, 387 (2003). 
69  Nibutani Dam Decision, supra note 55, at 296. 
70  Jude Isabella, How Japan’s Bear-Worshipping Indigenous Group Fought Its Way to Cultural 
Relevance, HAKAI MAGAZINE (Oct. 18, 2017), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/how-bear-
worshipping-group-in-japan-fought-for-cultural-relevance-180965281/. 
71  Nibutani Dam Decision, supra note 55, at 296. 
72  Id. 
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[T]he background of the Project Plan enactment process, the 
details of the Project Plan that are raised in the Project 
Authorization, the public benefit that should occur from carrying 
out the Project Plan, the losing interests and accompanying costs 
that may arise out of the execution of the project, and the 
considerations that were made in response to the various losses 
arising from the instant project.73  
To condemn private property, the government must show that the public 
benefits outweigh the cumulative harm inflicted on public and private 
interests.74 In its analysis, the court acknowledged the public benefits gained 
by constructing the dam, including improving flood control, maintaining the 
Saru River’s flow, and increased water supply and electrical power 
generation.75  The court concluded there was little difference between the 
Nibutani dam and other projects that had been approved and this supported 
the project’s approval.76 However, the court observed that the private-public 
interest balancing test implicates the cultural rights of the Ainu, a minority 
group.77  
 The Expropriation Committee argued that, even if a minority’s right to 
enjoy their culture existed, the Land Expropriation Law did not confer the 
Ainu special protections subject to the public and private balancing test.78 In 
response, the court considered the scope and quality of legal interests held by 
Japan’s ethnic minorities. The court used a two-prong analysis, where it 
considered both Japan’s obligations under the ICCPR and the Japanese 
Constitution.79 After concluding that ethnic minorities possess the right to 
culture, the court explored whether the Ainu met the definition of an 
indigenous minority.80 Finally, the court analyzed the Nibutani dam project in 
light of both the public benefits and the harm inflicted on Ainu cultural rights.  
                                                 
 
73  Stewart, supra note 68, at 388 (quoting the Nibutani Dam Decision). 
74  Nibutani Dam Decision, supra note 55, at 296. 
75  Id. at 297. 
76  Id. at 297. 
77  Id.  
78  Id.  
79  Id. at 299–302. 
80  Id. at 300.  
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 The court concluded that Japan’s international legal obligations 
required the recognition of ethnic minorities.81 According to the court, the 
ICCPR was binding because the Diet ratified the treaty in 1979 and Article 
98(2) of the Constitution provided that treaties have legal force.82 The court 
observed that the preamble established the dignity and equal rights of all 
persons, including the “inherent dignity of the individual.”83 Article 2(1)84 and 
Article 2685 of the ICCPR prevent distinctions based on race, language, sex, 
and religion, among other statuses, and provide for equal protection.86 In light 
of the ICCPR preamble and the aforementioned articles, the court applied the 
text of Article 27, which read in relevant part: 
[I]n those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities 
exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied 
the right, in community with the other members of their group, 
to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own 
religion, or to use their own language.87 
The court noted that, based on the Government of Japan’s own reports to the 
U.N. Human Rights Committee, it was undisputed that the Ainu are a minority 
protected by Article 27 of the ICCPR.88 In addition to the ICCPR preamble 
and the protections of Article 2(1) and Article 26, Article 27 protects the rights 
of individuals belonging to a minority to practice their unique culture, 
language, and religion. 89  Accordingly, the government was obligated to 
“exercise due care” to prevent the passage of policies that harm minority 
culture.90 Although the scope of minority protections may be balanced against 
other public needs as defined in Articles 12 and 13, the court concluded that 
individuals may seek to enforce minority rights under the ICCPR.91 
                                                 
 
81  Id. at 298–99. 
82  Id. at 298. 
83  Id. at 297. 
84  G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), art. 2(1), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Mar. 23, 
1976). 
85  Id. art. 26.  
86  Id.  
87  Id. art. 27. 
88  Nibutani Dam Decision, supra note 55, at 298. 
89  Id. 
90  Id. 
91  Id. 
 
218 WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL VOL. 28 NO. 1 
 
 
 The court analyzed Article 13 of the Japanese Constitution in a manner 
similar to the ICCPR.92 The court wrote that Article 13 “demands the highest 
regard for the individual” in relation to the state.93 Regarding diversity, Article 
13 “demands meaningful, not superficial” respect for individuals and 
differences among people.94 In the context of majority and minority relations, 
the court concluded that a minority’s distinct culture is an “essential 
commodity” for self-survival.95  
 The constitutional guarantee of minority rights, therefore, fulfills basic 
tenets of democracy,96 and Article 13 protects the rights of minorities to enjoy 
their culture.97 Even if minority rights are subject to the public welfare clause, 
the court wrote that limitations on minority rights “must be kept to the 
narrowest degree necessary.”98 Accordingly, the protection of minority rights 
is afforded special consideration under the Constitution.99 
 The court concluded that the Ainu meet the definition of “indigenous 
people” required to receive protection under ICCPR Article 27. Interestingly, 
the court provided its own definition of indigenous people, defining minority 
populations as a social group that historically “existed outside of a state’s rule” 
until their subjugation by the state.100 In addition, the indigenous people must 
have had a culture and identity different from the majority and have “not since 
lost the unique culture and identity.”101 This definition is problematic because 
it implies that groups totally subsumed within the Japanese state would have 
no protections or redress, even if the loss of culture or identity resulted from 
majority domination. Given the government’s once-held position that there 
are no minorities in Japan, the court’s definition of indigenous peoples leaves 
open the possibility that a court could ignore minority claims if they conclude 
that a minority sufficiently lost its unique identity.   
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 Nevertheless, the court acknowledged that the Ainu inhabited 
Hokkaido before it was incorporated into the Japanese state.102 The court then 
engaged in a historical analysis that was honest and reflective regarding the 
relationship between the wajin, the Japanese government, and the Ainu. The 
court concluded that the assimilationist policies imposed by the Meiji 
government caused the Ainu to lose their “ethnic culture, lifestyle, [as well as] 
traditional customs.” 103  Prohibitions on Ainu fishing were especially 
devastating, and the court conceded that attempts to “stabilize” the lifestyle of 
Ainu failed.104  As a result, the Ainu are an indigenous minority that are 
deserving of protections under the ICCPR and Japanese Constitution.105  
 Finally, the court considered the obligations of the government with 
respect to the Nibutani dam project. The court placed special importance upon 
Ainu religious ceremonies and customs held in the Nibutani area. 106  For 
example, the Nibutani area was home to burial grounds, worship places, and 
other sacred sites, and these were important to understanding the history and 
culture of Ainu people.107 The court observed that the “essence” of Ainu 
culture depends on its close connection to nature.108 Thus, the project’s threat 
to Ainu interests was especially high.109 Therefore, public officials must give 
“the greatest degree of consideration” to Ainu minority rights in applying the 
Land Expropriation Law.110  
 The court concluded that the Ministry of Construction failed to 
adequately consider the cultural interests of the Ainu during the project 
approval process.111 The court noted that authorities knew that the planned 
development area would disproportionately impact the Ainu since most of the 
condemned land belonged to Ainu.112 Nevertheless, the planning authorities 
did nothing to investigate the project’s impact on Ainu culture. At the very 
least, the court stated that the planning authorities should have conducted the 
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“equivalent of a preliminary environmental assessment.” 113  The court 
concluded that when the Ministry of Construction approved the project, it 
should have given the “highest regard” to balancing the public benefits of the 
project with the Ainu’s cultural interests.114 The authorization of the project—
before any study investigating the Ainu’s interests—therefore, was illegal 
under the Land Expropriation Law Article 20(3).115  
 However, even if the project was illegal, the court refused to reverse the 
expropriation order. 116  The court concluded that public policy concerns 
required rejecting the plaintiffs’ complaints.117 The court based its conclusion 
on the fact that the dam construction project was already near completion and 
that most of the cultural sites had already been destroyed.118 In light of these 
facts and remedial measures by the Hokkaido government, the removal of the 
dam would cause even greater damage. In spite of this result, the court 
expressed hope that “from this time forward” there would be sufficient 
consideration to Ainu culture by the national and local governments.119  
E. The Nibutani Dam Decision—Unmet Expectations? 
 The decision of the Sapporo District in the Nibutani Dam Decision is 
important because it marked the first time that a Japanese court recognized the 
rights of indigenous minorities based on the ICCPR and Article 13 of the 
Constitution. In addition, it was important that the court addressed the 
historical relationship between the Ainu and wajin—acknowledging wajin 
responsibility for the cultural and socio-economic deterioration of the Ainu. 
In doing so, the court repudiated the typical narrative that Japan is a 
homogenous nation with a single cultural, linguistic, and ethnic heritage. 
Taken to its logical extreme, the Nibutani Dam Decision has the potential to 
redefine the relationship between the Ainu, wajin, and the Japanese 
government.    
 Yet, for many Ainu, the value of the Nibutani Dam Decision has proved 
to be more symbolic than substantive. The decision by the Sapporo District 
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Court remains the only one of its kind. The predicted rush of Ainu-rights 
related cases never materialized. In fact, litigation filed by Ainu activists in 
the Sapporo District Court was rejected in 1999.120 It is unclear whether the 
Nibutani Dam Decision played any role in the Diet’s decision to officially 
recognize the Ainu. The resolution was passed in 2008, fifteen years after the 
Nibutani Dam Decision.121 Critics also noted that the resolution’s passage was 
timed with Japan’s hosting of an international conference of indigenous 
peoples in Hokkaido.122 Most importantly, most of the major socio-economic 
disparities between the Ainu and the general population remain.123 The idea 
that Japan’s judiciary—a notoriously conservative institution 124 —will 
continue to create legal pressure for change seems slim. Nevertheless, the door 
is open for change and greater recognition of minority Ainu rights. As the 
population of Japan’s wajin continues to decline, those voices may become 
louder.  
IV. MĀORI IN NEW ZEALAND  
A. Historical Background 
 The Māori discovered New Zealand and named it Aotearoa, which 
translates into “long white cloud.”125 Like the Native Hawaiians, the Māori 
descended from Polynesian explorers who ventured from Central Polynesia 
across the Pacific Ocean.126 According to Māori legend, a demigod named 
Māui discovered Aotearoa’s north island after catching it with a magic fishing 
hook.127 The first explorer to arrive in Aotearoa was named Kupe.128 Kupe 
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used the stars to navigate across the Pacific on his waka hourua (voyaging 
canoe). Kupe arrived at Hokianga Harbor in Northland, around one thousand 
years ago. Western historians still debate when the Māori arrived in New 
Zealand but scientific and archaeological evidence suggest that first 
permanent settlement was established around 1300 A.D.129   
 The Māori developed into organized, autonomous communities that 
were connected through political alliances and kinship.130 The largest unit in 
Māori society was the iwi, which derived from common ancestry and did not 
include a permanent leader.131 Instead, decisions resulted from negotiations 
among chiefs and family leaders.132 Disputes were resolved through custom 
according to tikanga Māori,133 which loosely translates into the correct or 
ethical way of doing things according to Māori culture.134  
 The first Europeans “discovered” New Zealand in 1642 during Dutch 
explorer Abel Tasman’s expedition.135  However, Tasman departed before 
landing after his men engaged in a skirmish with the Māori.136 James Cook 
was the next European explorer to interact with the Māori in 1769. 137 
European contact accelerated as the whaling and sealing trade grew and 
required port settlements. 138 By the 1830s, the British coveted a colony to 
protect their trade interests and preempt French interest in Aotearoa.139  
 The British obtained sovereignty over New Zealand following the 
signing of a treaty with Māori chiefs. In 1840, Great Britain and 500 Māori 
chiefs signed the Treaty of Waitangi, which purported to make a political 
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compact between the British and the Māori. 140  However, significant 
controversy remains over differences between the English and Māori text. 
Different interpretations of the Māori and English translations resulted in the 
belief that the Māori did not intentionally cede their sovereignty to the Crown. 
The English version declared that the Māori ceded sovereignty but retained 
“full exclusive and undisturbed possession” of their land, estates, property, 
forests, and fisheries. 141  However, the Māori version translated the word 
“sovereignty” as kawatanga, which means governance.142 This led the Māori 
signatories to believe that the Crown would have authority over British settlers 
alone and the Māori chiefs would retain tino rangatiratanga (sovereignty) 
over their taonga (treasures), including control over property and people.143 
 Disputes over interpretations of the Treaty of Waitangi resulted in 
conflict between Māori and Europeans as more Europeans arrived and sought 
Māori land. In 1859, a minor chief agreed to sell land to the Crown in Taraniki, 
a mountainous region on the north island.144 When a higher ranked chief 
disputed the sale, war broke out between the British settlers and Māori.145 
Although the Māori achieved some military success, they were outnumbered 
by British soldiers 18,000 to 4,000.146 Conflict persisted until 1872 when the 
last Māori chiefs surrendered.147 The Land Wars resulted in a new phase of 
land redistribution that was arguably as destructive as the wars themselves.148 
The British targeted the land of Māori that had fought and lost. After passage 
of the New Zealand Settlements Acts 1863, the Crown confiscated around one 
million hectares.149  
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 The Native Land Court, the predecessor to the Māori Land Court, was 
established in 1865.150 The Court allowed Māori customary land to be re-
classified as freehold land—the most common form of land ownership in New 
Zealand. The reclassification made it easier to transfer land from Māori to 
European settlers because encumbrances on the land were removed and the 
government could control the price and size of parcels sold.151 Even at the 
time, the Native Land Court’s role in land redistribution was criticized. In 
1890, an Auckland lawyer named William Rees led an investigation into the 
validity of Māori land sales. The findings concluded that the Native Land 
Court was responsible for “the difficulties, the frauds, and the suffering of 
Māori landowners.” 152  Although several other investigations and 
commissions, including one headed by a Supreme Court justice resulted in the 
Crown paying annual reparation payments to Māori landowners, other statutes 
were used to justify the transfer of Māori land. In particular, public works acts 
dating as far back as the 1880s provided the Crown with the power to 
confiscate land in the name of public infrastructure projects and Māori land 
was often disproportionally targeted.153 
 The Waitangi Tribunal set up a clear institution for Māori claims for 
breach of the Treaty. The Waitangi Tribunal is a standing quasi-judicial 
institution that possesses exclusive jurisdiction to interpret the “meaning and 
effect of the Treaty of Waitangi.” 154  The Tribunal’s authority extends to 
identifying and responding to Treaty-related issues, including the power to 
review acts or omissions by the Crown for compliance with the Treaty’s 
principles.155 However, the Tribunal’s enforcement powers are limited. In 
most cases, the Tribunal can only give recommendations. The notable 
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exception relates to Māori land. The Tribunal can direct State Enterprise and 
Crown Forest lands to be returned to the Māori.156  
 Māori custom is also an important source of law in New Zealand. Along 
with the passage of the Treaty of Waitangi Act, Māori customs have played 
an increasingly important role in New Zealand’s legal development. Known 
as tikanga Māori, the individual Māori tribes had firmly established rules of 
governance, social structures, and accepted norms and customs relating to 
trade and land rights, protecting the environment, and conflict resolution.157 
New Zealand’s courts now recognize that applying Treaty principles requires 
consideration of tikanga Māori.158 The former chief judge of the Māori Land 
Use Court cites the Treaty for the proposition that New Zealand law has “its 
source in two streams”—both English law and tikanga Māori.159 Under New 
Zealand common law, Māori custom is also applicable in cases where there is 
no controlling treaty or statutory authority in cases involving aboriginal rights 
and aboriginal title. Under these doctrines, customary laws or practices that 
are continuous must be protected by courts if they have not been extinguished 
by statute. This has included fishing, hunting, and gathering rights.160 New 
Zealand courts hold that “customs and practices which include spiritual 
elements are cognizable in a Court of law provided they are properly 
established[.]”161  
 The Māori Land Court is an important institution adjudicating disputes 
related to Māori land and title rights. The court hears matters relating to the 
status, ownership, management, and use of Māori land.162 The Māori Land 
Court holds a register of all Māori land and has the power to accept 
applications to transfer Māori land ownership, establish Māori land trusts or 
incorporations, or recommend the establishment of a Māori reservation.163 
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Although the Māori Land Court performs an important function, it has been 
severely criticized. In the late 1800s and early 1900s, the court played an 
important role in the loss of Māori control of land by registering and alienating 
Māori land. However, today the Māori Land Court aims to promote 
reconciliation and the protection Māori land claims.164 The court is mandated 
by statute to “promote and assist in retention of Māori land . . . in the hands 
of the owners; and the effective use, management, and development . . . of 
Māori land or General land owned by Māori.”165   
 Today, Māori, make up almost fifteen percent of the national 
population.166 They are younger and more urban. Eighty-seven percent live on 
the northern island with a quarter in the Auckland metropolitan area.167 The 
median age of Māori is twenty-two years old—compared to the national 
population median of thirty-three. 168  Māori are more likely to be 
underemployed than the general population.169 Māori land makes up less than 
six percent of New Zealand’s land area. Māori land is also mostly 
concentrated on the northern island (where most iwi resided before European 
contact).170 Nevertheless, a large portion of Māori land is regarded as poorer 
quality because the most fertile land was confiscated by British settlers. Māori 
land is also less likely to have productive potential because significant areas 
are in forests, coasts, or areas bordering rivers or lakes with more local land 
controls.171   
B. Grace v. New Zealand Transport Agency 
 The Māori Land Court decided Grace v. New Zealand Transport 
Agency in March 2014, affirming the conversion of Māori freehold land into 
a reservation and imposed stricter limitations on the Crown’s ability to acquire 
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land to advance public works.172 In doing so, the court restricted the Crown’s 
ability to convert land under the Public Works Act. While the decision alone 
cannot redress long-standing inequities, Grace represents an important step 
for the Māori Land Court in restricting one of the remaining ways that the 
Crown could acquire Māori land. Moreover, because the case involved a great 
deal of publicity, it has the potential to change the national conversation in a 
way beyond its strict legal application. 
 Patricia Grace is an acclaimed Māori author whose book, Potiki, won a 
national literary award in 1987.173 In the book, the Māori protagonist and her 
husband oppose the development of a resort along an unspoiled coastline.174 
In a strange twist of fate, real life mirrored Grace’s fictional work. Grace and 
her case captured national headlines with another tale of a small Māori 
community seeking to prevent development. In 2010, the New Zealand 
Transport Agency (NZTA) began construction of an expressway from 
Wellington’s northern suburbs to Peka Peka, a small seaside town along the 
Kapiti coast north of the capital.175 The original plan proposed acquiring land 
that had belonged to Grace’s ancestors along the Kapiti coast. As a result, 
Grace and the local community protested to prevent the NZTA’s acquisition 
of Māori land.  
 Grace commenced her litigation in 2013 by petitioning the Māori Land 
Court to set aside Māori freehold land as a reservation.176 Grace was the sole 
owner of the land and direct descendant of the original owner.177 Grace argued 
that the land was also one of the last undeveloped blocks on the Kapiti Coast 
and she had spent years seeking its preservation.178 Soon thereafter, a second 
case was filed in New Zealand’s Environmental Court.179 As a result, the 
controversy proceeded in two stages: (1) the Māori Land Court ruled on the 
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parcel’s status as a Māori reservation and (2) the Environmental Court 
determined whether the Public Works Act allowed the NZTA to acquire the 
land.180 In both instances, the courts sided with Grace against the NZTA. 
 In order to designate Grace’s land as a Māori reservation, the Māori 
Land court was required to consider whether her application fulfilled the 
statutory requirements of the Māori Land Act 1993.181 The statute requires the 
proponent of reservation status to show that the parcel meets one of two 
conditions. The parcel can be a place of special “cultural, historic, or scenic 
interest” or wahi tapau, which means “a place of special significance 
according to tikanga Māori.” 182  The court was persuaded by Grace’s 
arguments on both issues, noting three important factors. First, the absence of 
Māori land in the Kapiti area favored designating Grace’s land a reservation 
because it heightened the need to protect Māori interests.183 Second, because 
Grace’s ancestors were the original owners, the court considered the 
likelihood that there had been burials on the land.184 Grace testified that she 
believed there were burials and her testimony was strengthened by the 
discovery of burials nearby.185 Finally, the court considered the association of 
the land with key historical and cultural events. Here, the court took a broad 
view of the meaning and importance of historical and cultural events.  
 The NZTA had argued that before land could be designated a 
reservation for historical reasons, there should be tangible physical evidence 
including archaeological remains to prove its historical importance.186 The 
court rejected this argument, holding that cultural and historical importance 
includes evidence of spiritual connections with the land. 187  The court 
concluded that to do otherwise would ignore Māori culture and customs.188 
As a result, the court found Grace’s testimony to be persuasive regarding both 
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her ancestral connection with the land and her desire to protect it in a culturally 
appropriate way.189   
 The court’s broad approach to designating land with Māori reservation 
status may have important consequences. Once a parcel is designated a 
reservation, the Court held that it cannot be alienated, including by the 
Crown.190 As a result, the designation of Māori land as a reservation has the 
potential to be a powerful restriction on future uses and transfers. Moreover, 
the potentially broad list of criteria means that more parcels could be 
designated as reservations in the future.  
 The Environmental Court affirmed the ruling of Māori Land Court by 
holding that land designated as a Māori reservation could not be alienated or 
sold to the Crown. 191  The Environmental Court also contemplated the 
acquisition of the Māori land based on the Public Works Act. The Court held 
that acquisition of land under the Act must be “fair, sound, and reasonably 
necessary” to achieve the government’s objectives.192 The Court held that the 
NZTA failed to meet this standard in proposing the expressway. Instead, the 
Court wrote that Section 24(7)(b) required adequate consideration of 
alternative sites, routes, or methods.193 The Court concluded that the NZTA 
failed to adequately consider alternatives to building the expressway on 
Grace’s land.194 In light of the evidence favoring the land’s historical and 
cultural significance, the Court held that it was not fair or reasonably 
necessary to compel the acquisition of land where alternative routes were 
available. 195  As a result, the Court found that the Crown’s attempted 
acquisition was unnecessary and should not proceed further.196 The Court’s 
ruling was a victory for Māori land rights, particularly given the public 
attention that the case received. Nevertheless, the case highlights the need for 
reforming the Public Works Act with legislation providing for stronger Māori 
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protections since the Court’s opinion suggested that had the NZTA given 
more adequate consideration of alternative routes, it may have been legal.  
V. NATIVE HAWAIIANS IN THE STATE OF HAWAIʻI 
A. Historical Background 
 Native Hawaiians are the indigenous people of Hawaiʻi, who settled the 
Hawaiian islands, founded the Hawaiian nation, and exercised sovereignty 
over the islands.197 The earliest Hawaiian colonies were established in 300 
A.D. by Polynesian explorers. 198  Over centuries of isolation, the Native 
Hawaiians developed their own language, culture, system of governance, 
religion, and social system.199 Even today, the landscape of Hawaiʻi bears the 
imprint of a sophisticated social system ordered around the cultivation of the 
land and ocean. As a result, the land, or ‘Āina in Hawaiian, plays a significant 
role in Hawaiian religious, cultural, and ceremonial activities.200  
 The Kingdom of Hawaiʻi originated in 1795 after the unification of the 
Hawaiian Islands under King Kamehameha I. 201  The Kingdom exercised 
sovereignty over the islands and conducted foreign policy with other nation 
states. The United States was the first foreign power that the Kingdom entered 
into a treaty with in 1826.202 The original treaty benefited American whalers 
and traders while providing some assurances that the Kingdom could remain 
neutral in the event that the United States and Britain—then one of the 
Kingdom’s closest diplomatic partners—went to war.203 Moreover, it also 
provided Americans with standing to sue Hawaiian subjects and 
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foreshadowed future demands for the extraterritorial application of U.S. 
law.204 Nevertheless, the United States federal government had not dealt with 
the Kingdom in the same government-to-government fashion compared to 
North American tribes based in Alaska and the continental states.205  
 American missionaries from New England began arriving in the 
1820s. 206  Their arrival contributed to a gradual deterioration of Native 
Hawaiian traditions, culture, and land rights. Much like the Ainu, traditional 
dress, dance, and other symbols were either banned or discouraged at the 
behest of the missionaries.207  Small pox and measles reduced the Native 
Hawaiian population by seventy-five percent from the time James Cook 
arrived in 1778 to 1853.208  As descendants of the American missionaries 
became wealthy from the sugar trade, their political influence became the 
dominating force in Hawaiian politics.209 In 1848, Western advisors to King 
Kamehameha III persuaded him to adopt land reform known as the Great 
Mahele, transitioning the Kingdom to a Western-style fee simple system with 
no restrictions on foreign ownership.210 The policy helped entrench the power 
and wealth of non-Native interests. After the reform, non-Native Hawaiians 
owned over sixty percent of fee simple lands.211  
 By 1893, conditions were ripe to overthrow the constitutional 
monarchy of Hawaiʻi. 212  With Marines landing in Honolulu, Queen 
Liliʻuokalani yielded her authority to a provisional government established by 
descendants of the original American missionaries.213 Hawaiʻi was formally 
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annexed five years later and was admitted into the United States in 1959.214 In 
1978, Hawaiʻi adopted its State Constitution. During the seventies, Hawaiʻi 
experienced a wave of activism supporting greater Native Hawaiian rights and 
protections. 215  The Constitution included protections of Native Hawaiian 
culture and land rights.216 Moreover, the Office of Hawaiian Affairs (OHA) 
was established.217 OHA was a semi-autonomous department to manage lands 
once owned by the Hawaiian Kingdom.218 
 In 1993, President Clinton signed a joint-resolution apologizing to the 
Native Hawaiian people for the United States’ role in the overthrow and 
recognizing them as “indigenous people.”219 However, the resolution stopped 
short at granting Native Hawaiians the same federal recognition as Native 
Americans and Alaskans.220  By 2000, Native Hawaiians made up twenty 
percent of Hawaiʻi’s population.221  The socio-economic statistics indicate 
disparity between Native Hawaiians and Hawaiʻi’s Chinese, Japanese, and 
Caucasian populations. 222  Native Hawaiians are disproportionately 
represented in the criminal justice system and suffer higher rates of 
homelessness.223  
 Hawaiʻi’s attempts at reconciliation have at times been frustrated by 
U.S. federal courts. For example, in Rice v. Cayetano, the U.S. Supreme Court 
held that Hawaiʻi’s Constitutional provision that restricts voting in OHA 
elections to persons of Native Hawaiian descent violated the Fifteenth 
Amendment.224 The challenge was brought by a resident of European descent 
and the Court accepted his argument that it was an unconstitutional race-based 
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voting classification.225 Nevertheless, while the State of Hawaiʻi’s attempts at 
redressing historical injustices have been challenged in federal courts, the 
United States’ federalist system protects the State’s broad power to protect 
Native Hawaiian rights in areas that do not conflict with federal law and the 
State Constitution has played an important role in institutionalizing Native 
Hawaiian rights.  
B. Background: Mauna Kea and the Thirty Meter Telescope  
 In recent years, the conflict over the fate of Mauna Kea has defined the 
struggle between the State’s balancing of Native Hawaiian land rights and 
other private and public interests. The Hawaiʻi Supreme Court unanimously 
vacated the permit for the construction of the Thirty Meter Telescope (TMT) 
planned atop Mauna Kea in 2015.226 The Court’s decision reflects Hawaiʻi's 
unique State Constitution, a greater respect for procedural due process rights 
than Japan, and—as a result—an administrative process that is more 
responsive to the indigenous rights of Native Hawaiians to practice their 
culture.  
 Located on the east side of the island of Hawaiʻi, Mauna Kea rises to 
13,796 feet above sea level and is one of the tallest mountains in the world 
measured from the seafloor.227 Astronomers regard the mountain’s summit as 
one of the best places in the world for observing distant solar systems and one 
of the few places in the world that is dark, dry, and calm enough for a billion 
dollar telescope. 228  There are already thirteen telescopes on Mauna Kea, 
involving NASA and international partners such as Japan.229 Nevertheless, the 
TMT project is the biggest, most powerful telescope in the world—stronger 
than the Hubble Telescope—at a cost of $1.4 billion.230 The telescope is thirty 
meters in diameter with attached instruments to record data and an enclosed 
dome.231 The TMT project involves building an astronomy observatory and 
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construction of ancillary facilities for the astronomers and access roads on 
five-acres of Mauna Kea’s upper slopes.232  
 The land on Mauna Kea once belonged to the Kingdom of Hawaiʻi and 
is classified as “ceded lands.”233 The State of Hawaiʻi administers them for 
the benefit of Native Hawaiians. As a site of ancient Hawaiian burials and a 
place of worship, Native Hawaiians regard the mountain as sacred. The upper 
slopes are also classified by the State as a “conservation district”—requiring 
special approval from the State including permits for construction.234  
C. The Hawaiʻi Supreme Court’s TMT Decision 
 In Mauna Kea Anaina Hou v. Board of Land and Natural Resources 
(hereinafter referred to as “the TMT Decision”), the plaintiffs challenged the  
State’s issuance of a construction permit before the occurrence of public 
hearings, which would have allowed Native Hawaiian viewpoints to be heard.  
 The University of Hawaiʻi at Hilo (UHH) submitted an application to 
the Board of Land and Natural Resources (BLNR) for construction of the 
TMT telescope. 235  The BNLR held a series of public hearings. 236  Native 
Hawaiian opponents of the construction stated that the proposed site was on 
sacred land and that construction would be a desecration of Native Hawaiian 
culture.237 The hearings drew high attendance and speakers were only allowed 
to speak for five minutes each.238 At a meeting in February 2011, Native 
Hawaiian opponents requested a contested case hearing before the BLNR 
reached its final decision.239  
 Under Hawaiʻi law, a contested case hearing is “a proceeding in which 
the legal rights, duties, or privileges of specific parties are required by law to 
be determined.”240 The benefits of a contested case include the fact that parties 
may be represented by counsel and that they have the right to present 
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evidence, including calling witnesses sworn under oath and cross-examining 
opposing witnesses.241 Contested case hearings are mandatory if the party 
seeking a contested hearing has a property interest as defined in the State 
Constitution.242 
 In that same February 2011 meeting, BLNR granted the opponent’s 
request for a contested hearing and approved the permit requested by TMT.243 
The BLNR held the hearing in August 2011.244 At the hearing, opponents 
raised the argument that their due process rights were violated by its prior 
approval of the construction permit.245 After the hearing, the officer approved 
the BLNR’s decision to grant the permit. The plaintiffs appealed to the State 
circuit court, which affirmed BLNR’s decision to grant the TMT permit before 
the contested case hearing.246 The circuit court reasoned that the BLNR’s 
grant was “preliminary” and depended on a “final grant after a contested case 
hearing.”247 On appeal, the plaintiffs requested and received a transfer to the 
Hawaiʻi Supreme Court.248  
 The Hawaiʻi Supreme Court held that the Native Hawaiian opponents 
of TMT were entitled to a contested case hearing before the BLNR issued the 
construction permit. 249  The BLNR violated the due process rights of the 
plaintiffs by issuing the permit before the hearings.250 As a result, the permit 
approved by the BLNR was ruled to be invalid.251  
 The Hawaiʻi Supreme Court found that the Native Hawaiian plaintiffs 
were entitled to a contested case hearing as a matter of constitutional due 
process.252 The Native Hawaiians were entitled to exercise their rights and 
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practice their culture. 253  The Hawaiʻi Supreme Court noted the explicit 
protections of Article XII, Section 7 of the Hawaiʻi Constitution, which states:  
The State reaffirms and shall protect all rights, customarily and 
traditionally exercised for subsistence, cultural and religious 
purposes and possessed by ahupua‘a 254  tenants who are 
descendants of native Hawaiians who inhabited the Hawaiian 
Islands prior to 1778, subject to the right of the State to regulate 
such rights.255  
Throughout the dispute over TMT, the Native Hawaiian plaintiffs 
alleged that TMT’s construction would have significant negative effects on 
Native Hawaiian cultural practices on Mauna Kea. 256  As a result of the 
Hawaiʻi Constitution, the Hawaiʻi Supreme Court concluded that Native 
Hawaiian interests in the dispute were “substantial” and a contested case 
hearing was “required by law” in light of the risk to Native Hawaiian cultural 
rights.257 The Hawaiʻi Supreme Court then considered the sequencing of the 
contested case hearing and the BLNR’s approval of the construction permit.  
 The Hawaiʻi Supreme Court concluded that contested case hearings 
must occur before any approval for the construction permits.258 Article I, 
Section 5 of the Hawaiʻi Constitution provides that “no person shall be 
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.”259 The court 
reasoned that the basic elements of due process include “the opportunity to be 
heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” 260  The court 
concluded that due process rights extend to administrative hearings and that 
giving plaintiffs “a day in court” alone did not guarantee that a process is 
fair.261 Due process requires unbiased hearings and forbids decision-makers 
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from “prejudging matters and the appearance of prejudging matters.”262  
 Applying these rules to the TMT dispute, the Hawaiʻi Supreme Court 
found that the BLNR improperly awarded the TMT permit before the actual 
contested hearing. 263  The Hawaiʻi Supreme Court wrote that the entire 
purpose of the contested case hearing is to ensure that the factual record is 
fully developed and subject to adversarial testing before decisions are made.264 
The Supreme Court rejected the argument that the permit was “preliminary” 
and dependent on final approval based on the contested case hearing.265 After 
the February 2011 hearing, the Hawaiʻi Supreme Court noted that the BLNR 
sent numerous letters to UHH describing the TMT project as “approved” and 
referred to the permit as “the permit” rather than as “a preliminary permit.”266 
Furthermore, the beginning of construction was not “conditioned” on the 
contested hearing but on pre-construction requirements and mitigation 
measures.267 As a result, the original permit was a decision on the merits of 
TMT’s application and supported the Native Hawaiian appellant’s argument 
that the BLNR had pre-judged the outcome before the contested case 
hearing.268  
 The Hawaiʻi Supreme Court unanimously found that the TMT permit 
was invalid based on the right of Native Hawaiians to raise claims asserting a 
cultural and property interest in Mauna Kea. This framework—with an 
emphasis on procedural due process rights—leaves open the possibility that 
the permit could be subsequently approved. As a result, although TMT and 
UHH were halted from construction related to the project, the Hawaiʻi 
Supreme Court could likely hear the case again if the BLNR approves the 
permit after a contested case hearing.269  
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 Nevertheless, the concurrence of Associate Justice Pollack—which was 
also signed by Associate Justice Wilson—suggests that Hawaiʻi courts could 
go even further in future disputes and reject the permit outright. According to 
Justice Pollack, Article XII, Section 7 of the State Constitution creates an 
affirmative obligation on the government to engage in “heightened inquiry” 
when Native Hawaiian individuals assert that traditional customs will be 
adversely impacted by a project requiring BLNR approval.270 In addition, 
Justice Pollack argued that Hawaiʻi’s public-trust doctrine applies based on 
Hawaiʻi common law and Article XI, Section 1 of the State Constitution.271 
According to Justice Pollack, Hawaiʻi case law establishes that one purpose 
of the public-trust doctrine is to protect Native Hawaiian culture.272 Thus, 
since the land in question was public land, the BLNR had a duty to ensure that 
the proposed use by TMT satisfied all requirement of the public trust doctrine, 
including the protection of Native Hawaiian culture.273 Accordingly, if the 
BLNR could not reconcile the project’s aims with protecting Native Hawaiian 
culture, Justice Pollack seems to be hinting that the courts could reject the 
permits based on the merits as well as procedural grounds.  
VI. COMPARISON 
 The Nibutani Dam Decision, Grace cases, and the TMT Decision each 
reflect different constitutional designs and legal systems. In addition, the 
decisions produced different results for the Ainu and Native Hawaiian 
plaintiffs. Both the Sapporo District Court and the Hawaiʻi Supreme Court 
agreed to the general principle that indigenous minorities were entitled to a 
right to practice their own culture. However, the Hawaiʻi Supreme Court 
resolved this question relatively quickly and easily because Article VII, 
Section 7 of the Hawaiʻi Constitution explicitly requires the protection of 
Native Hawaiian culture. Meanwhile, the Sapporo District Court was required 
to infer Ainu cultural rights from Japan’s international legal obligations under 
the ICCPR and Article 13 of the Constitution of Japan—neither of which 
explicitly referred to the Ainu. Furthermore, New Zealand’s specialized courts 
involved a somewhat more complicated process between the Māori Land 
Court and the Environmental Court. Nevertheless, these specialized courts 
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could refer to protections for Māori reaffirmed by the Waitangi Tribunal and 
Māori Lands Act.  
 The importance of the explicit protection of indigenous rights cannot 
be understated. Because it was easy for a court to find that indigenous rights 
are constitutionally protected, the Hawaiʻi Supreme Court was able to dispose 
of the matter quicker and address the real question of whether Native 
Hawaiians were deprived of their due process rights by the BLNR’s permit. 
After finding a due process violation, the project was halted until the BLNR 
held the hearings that the State Constitution required. Similar to Hawaiʻi 
courts, New Zealand’s creation of land courts with special jurisdiction served 
to facilitate the disposition of Grace’s claims. Although the Māori Land 
Court’s history is undoubtedly complicated by the legacy of its predecessor—
the Native Lands Court—it has proved to be an effective mechanism for 
reconciling historical grievances and disputes since the late seventies.  
 In contrast to the plaintiffs in Hawai‛i and New Zealand, the Ainu 
plaintiffs raised their initial complaint in 1989, brought suit in the Sapporo 
court in 1993, and received a decision in 1997. In the meantime, dam 
construction proceeded and destroyed many of the sites the plaintiffs sought 
to protect. If Japanese courts had understood the dispute as a rights-based 
question from the beginning, it is conceivable that the case would have been 
decided more quickly and that construction would have been halted until the 
plaintiff’s claims were adjudicated.  
 The different outcomes in Nibutani, the Grace cases, and TMT also 
raise important comparisons with regard to each legal system’s commitment 
to procedural due process. Requiring contested case hearings before the 
BLNR issued a permit for TMT allowed the plaintiffs the right to be heard 
with the full benefit of an adversarial process, demonstrated a commitment to 
public transparency, and—most importantly—prevented the actual 
construction before it was deemed illegal. Although the Ainu plaintiffs were 
allowed an administrative appeal in 1989, a Hawaiʻi court would likely have 
found that Ainu plaintiffs’ rights to procedural due process were violated 
because the construction actually occurred without an adequate opportunity 
for the plaintiffs’ claims to be heard. Similarly, the New Zealand Transport 
Agency was unable to proceed with construction of the Mackays to Peka Peka 
Expressway until Grace’s claims were adjudicated by both the Māori Land 
Court and the Environmental Court. Moreover, once Māori reservation status 
was established, the Public Works statute placed the burden on the NZTA to 
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establish that its proposal was reasonably necessary compared to alternative 
routes.   
 Although Article 31 of the Japan Constitution has been interpreted to 
require due process, the plaintiffs in Nibutani never raised a due process claim 
and the Sapporo court never seemed to have considered due process within its 
analysis. This suggests that the Japanese conceive of due process differently 
than in the United States and in New Zealand, especially when a plaintiff’s 
claims are rooted in administrative claims.  
 Differences in the long-term meaning of Nibutani and TMT also speak 
to Japan’s civil law traditions compared to New Zealand and Hawaiʻi’s 
common law systems. Ironically, the Sapporo District Court decision itself 
resembles a common law decision because—in breaking from the traditional 
narrative that Japan is composed of one culture and heritage—a judge played 
an active role in fashioning a new rule recognizing the cultural rights of the 
Ainu. Nevertheless, at least part of the limited impact of the Nibutani can be 
explained by its status as a civil legal system.  
 Since precedent in Japan is a mere guide, courts have not been 
pressured to follow Nibutani in similar cases or with similar plaintiffs. Hence, 
even the Sapporo District Court ruled against Ainu plaintiffs several years 
later. 274  Furthermore, Japan’s civil law system explains one reason why 
Nibutani will not be applied to other indigenous groups with similar 
complaints to the Ainu, like the Ryukyu people of Okinawa. Hawaiʻi and New 
Zealand, by contrast, are common law jurisdictions and the TMT Decision and 
Grace cases will add another layer to the developed body of case law on 
Native Hawaiian and Māori rights that will bind future courts. By virtue of 
being set in a common law system, therefore, the importance of the TMT 
Decision is enhanced for future Native Hawaiian plaintiffs and the same can 
be said about the Grace cases for Māori plaintiffs seeking to designate land as 
Māori reservation land. 
 Finally, the differences in Nibutani and TMT also speak to the role of 
the judiciary itself, judicial review, and culture. Although Japan has judicial 
review, Japanese courts are notoriously conservative and rarely strike down 
laws or rulings of the government. Hawaiʻi courts, like their counterparts in 
most U.S. jurisdictions, are much more willing to strike down government 
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laws, rulings, and policies. Indeed, Associate Justice Pollack’s concurrence 
suggests that the Hawaiʻi Supreme Court could have been more aggressive 
and ruled on the merits. In New Zealand, the creation of specialized courts 
serves to demonstrate another possible mechanism to adjudicate indigenous 
land claims. Nevertheless, the role of the Māori Land Court is complicated by 
its legacy aiding European confiscation of Māori land. Although the Land 
Court is now statutorily required to protect Māori interests in Māori land and 
the Grace cases demonstrate its contemporary commitment to doing so, the 
court’s history suggests that specialized adjudicatory bodies are not inherently 
better for indigenous people. Instead, the legal, political, and cultural forces 
that shape jurisprudence are critical to outcomes.  
VII. CONCLUSION 
 The experiences of the Ainu in Japan, the Native Hawaiians in the State 
of Hawaiʻi, and the Māori of New Zealand reveal similar dilemmas that courts 
face between recognizing the rights of indigenous groups and addressing 
questions of land development that supposedly benefit the majority 
population. The Nibutani Dam Decision reveals that explicit constitutional 
recognition of indigenous rights is not always necessary for courts to 
recognize indigenous protections. Courts can infer that indigenous rights 
should be protected through other constitutional guarantees and a nation’s 
treaty commitments. Nevertheless, explicit constitutional recognition of 
indigenous rights puts developers and government agencies on notice and 
leads to quicker recognition by courts of indigenous rights. Ultimately, this 
gives litigants the benefit of knowing that courts must acknowledge their 
rights and leads to rulings that halt construction before it begins. In addition, 
the importance of explicit constitutional recognition is also preferable to the 
patchwork of rights and restrictions on government power found in New 
Zealand’s unwritten constitution.  
 Because the Nibutani Dam Decision is the only court decision of its 
kind, it is difficult to assess whether it will force Japan’s government agencies 
to acknowledge indigenous rights and halt development projects when 
plaintiffs raise claims of violations of indigenous rights. Therefore, Ainu 
activists might consider seeking a constitutional amendment that explicitly 
protects indigenous rights. However, constitutional amendments are 
controversial in Japan and the strongest political block, the conservative 
Liberal Democratic Party, is unlikely to support indigenous rights or any 
further recognition of the Ainu beyond the 2008 resolution.  
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 A more realistic path to stronger protections of indigenous rights in land 
development cases may include focusing on the reform of the administrative 
hearing process and pushing courts towards greater recognition of procedural 
due process. Since the Japanese Constitution recognizes due process, this 
battle will be less uphill than amending the Constitution to grant indigenous 
rights. The Ainu should push for procedural mechanisms like Hawaiʻi’s 
contested case hearings. Even if Japan’s version of case hearings becomes less 
adversarial, hearings that fully develop the factual record and occur before 
construction have a better chance of ensuring that projects do not commence 
until indigenous rights are fully considered. In the alternative, prefectures like 
Hokkaido with a disproportionate amount of Ainu could follow New 
Zealand’s example and consider the establishment of specialized land courts 
to hear Ainu claims. In the language of the Hawaiʻi Supreme Court, the 
Nibutani Dam Decision suggests that the Ainu have the “right to be heard in 
a meaningful manner.” With any luck, Japanese courts will adequately protect 
the “right to be heard in a meaningful time.” 
